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On climate, conflict and cumulation 
Suggestions for integrative cumulation of knowledge in the research on climate 




Possible links between climate change and intra-state violent conflict have received major 
scholarly attention in recent years. But with few exceptions, there is still a low level of 
consensus in this research field. We argue that one reason for this disagreement is a lack of 
integrative cumulation of knowledge. Such an integrative cumulation is prevented by three 
obstacles, which have until now hardly been discussed in the literature. The first is the use of 
inadequate terms, discussed here with a focus on the labels ‘Malthusian’/‘cornucopian’ and 
the operationalization of key variables. Secondly, the weaknesses of large-N studies in 
research on climate change and violent conflict are not sufficiently reflected. These include a 
lack of data on crucial concepts as well as deficits of widely-used datasets. Thirdly, literature 
that deals with a possible link between adverse environmental change and peace (termed here 
‘environmental peace perspective’) has neither been systematized nor adequately considered 
in the debate so far. We provide examples of these shortcomings and make suggestions of 
how to address each of them. We also develop an integrative theoretical framework for the 
environmental peace perspective which facilitates its consideration in research on climate 
change and violent conflict. 
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1 Introduction1 
Climate change is estimated to raise the global mean temperature by between 1.0 and 3.7 
degrees by the end of the 21st century, compared to the period 1986-2005.2 The negative 
consequences of this include, inter alia, changed precipitation patterns, melting glaciers, rising 
sea level, worsening conditions for agriculture and more frequent or intense natural disasters.3 
For several years, policy makers and scientists alike have been concerned with whether these 
consequences of climate change might stimulate more violent conflict.4 US Secretary of State 
John Kerry, for instance, warned: ‘If we don’t respond adequately to the challenge of global 
 
1 We thank Sarah Nash as well as two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. 
2 IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
3 World Bank, Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts and the Case for Resilience 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2013). 
4 Hans Günter Brauch, 'Securitizing Global Environmental Change', in Facing Global Environmental Change, 
eds. Hans Günter Brauch et al. (Berlin: Springer, 2009), 65-104. 
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climate change over the course of these next years there will be people fighting wars over 
water and over land.’5 
But are such claims warranted? Various attempts have been made since the early 1990s to 
assess the links between environmental problems such as water scarcity or soil degradation 
and violent conflict.6 The arguments developed by this early research are quite similar to 
those circulating in the discussion about climate change and conflict, which developed rapidly 
from 2007 onwards.7 This is hardly surprising given the fact that climate change is one form 
of environmental change and that many environmental problems (e.g. scarcity of renewable 
resources) can be caused by climate change as well as by other factors (e.g. overuse, 
contamination, unequal distribution). 
Previous research largely agrees that environmental problems and climatic changes are 
unlikely to provoke inter-state violent disputes.8 Indeed, there is only a rather thin record of 
violent environmental conflicts between states. Theoretical reasons also suggest that this will 
not change soon. States usually have less cost-intensive strategies to cope with environmental 
problems while the governing elites (which command the military) are rarely personally 
affected by these challenges.9 
However, no consensus has yet been reached regarding the question of whether climatic 
changes increase the risk of intra-state violent conflicts, such as civil wars, paramilitary 
violence, riots or armed raids. This is a major shortcoming given that intra-state conflicts were 
more numerous and devastating than inter-state conflicts in the period between 1945 and 
2010, a trend which is unlikely to reverse soon.10 Two main positions can be distinguished in 
the debate: 
a) Climate Conflict: This perspective makes a twofold argument.11 It starts from the 
assumption that climate change will cause or aggravate environmental problems 
including water scarcity, rainfall variability, soil degradation, or a rise in the frequency 
and intensity of natural disasters (such as storms, floods, or landslides). In a second 
 
5 U.S. Department of State, 'Secretary Kerry Holds a Google+ Hangout with NBC's Andrea Mitchell' (2013), 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/05/209273.htm (15/11/2013). 
6 Günther Bächler, 'Why Environmental Transformations Causes Violence: A Synthesis', Environmental Change 
and Security Project Report 4, no. 1 (1998): 24-44; Thomas Homer-Dixon, 'Environmental Scarcities and 
Violent Conflict - Evidence from Cases', International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 5-40. 
7 Emily Meierding, 'Climate Change and Conflict: Avoiding Small Talk about the Weather', International 
Studies Review 15, no. 2 (2013): 185-203. 
8 Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Whither the Weather? Climate Change and Conflict', Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 
1 (2012): 3-9. 
9 Idean Salehyan, 'From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet', Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 3 
(2008): 315-26. 
10 Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, 'Armed Conflict, 1946-2010', Journal of Peace Resarch 48, no. 4 
(2011): 525-36. 
11 WBGU, World in Transition - Climate Change as a Security Risk (London: Earthscan, 2008). 
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step, these stresses might translate into societal problems commonly identified as 
increasing the risk of violent conflict, such as hunger,12 livelihood insecurity,13 
grievances about resource distribution and availability,14 predatory and opportunistic 
behavior by elites,15 outmigration,16 or a weakening of the state.17 But whether 
environmental stress translates into societal challenges and eventually violent conflicts 
strongly depends on the sensitivity, adaptive capacity and resilience of the respective 
societies.18 This is why climate change-induced violence is most likely to occur in the 
marginalized areas of economically less-developed and politically unstable 
countries.19 
b) Social Conflict: Proponents of this perspective claim that climate change plays no role, 
or only a minor role, in the onset of violent conflict. When facing environmental 
degradation, actors can react in various ways. Engaging in violent conflict is usually 
among the most costly and dangerous options20 and hampered by the interventions of 
state or traditional institutions (e.g. councils of elders).21 There is a wide consensus in 
conflict research about several political and socio-economic factors (e.g. medium level 
of democracy, low economic growth, past political violence) which raise the risk of 
intra-state violent conflict onset,22 while no such agreement exists about 
environmental or climate variables.23 The by far greater importance of political and 
 
12 Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Satoru Shimokawa, 'Do Poverty and Poor Health and Nutrition Increase the Risk of 
Armed Conflict Onset?', Food Policy 33, no. 6 (2008): 513-20. 
13 Janpeter Schilling, Francis Opiyo, and Jürgen Scheffran, 'Raiding Pastoral Livelihoods: Motives and Effects of 
Violent Conflict in North-Eastern Kenya', Pastoralism 2, no. 25 (2012): 1-16. 
14 Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt, 'Key Findings', in Ecolviolence: Links among Environment, 
Population, and Security, eds. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 
223-28. 
15 Colin H. Kahl, States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006). 
16 Rafael Reuveny, 'Ecomigration and Violent Conflict: Case Studies and Public Policy Implications', Human 
Ecology 36, no. 1 (2008): 1-13. 
17 Jon Barnett and W. Neil Adger, 'Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict', Political Geography 
26, no. 6 (2007): 639-55. 
18 Tom Deligiannis, 'The Evolution of Environment-Conflict Research: Toward a Livelihood Framework', 
Global Environmental Politics 12, no. 1 (2012): 78-100. 
19 Jürgen Scheffran and Antonella Battaglini, 'Climate and Conflicts: The Security Risks of Global Warming', 
Regional Environmental Change 11, no. 1 (2011): S27-S39. 
20 Idean Salehyan, 'From Climate Change to Conflict?'. 
21 Hanne Fjelde and Nina von Uexkull, 'Climate Triggers: Rainfall Anomalies, Vulnerability and Communal 
Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa', Political Geography 31, no. 7 (2012): 444-53; Tobias Hagmann, 'Fighting in the 
Desert? Conflict and Resource Management in East African Drylands', in Environmental Peacebuilding: 
Managing Natural Resource Conflicts in a Changing World, ed. Didier Péclard (Bern: swisspeace, 2009), 22-27. 
22 Jeffrey Dixon, 'What Causes Civil War? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings', International Studies 
Review 11, no. 4 (2009): 707-35. 
23 Ole Magnus Theisen, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, 'Is Climate Change a Driver of Armed 
Conflict?', Climatic Change 117, no. 3 (2013): 613-25. 
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socio-economic factors in causing or triggering violent conflict is also underscored by 
the many cases in which environmental degradation does not coincide with violence.24 
The debate has not remained in the theoretical realm. The various arguments of both 
perspectives have been tested through in-depth case studies as well as large-N studies. From 
the qualitative case studies, no clear picture emerges regarding a possible link between 
climate change and violent conflict. Some authors argue that environmental problems (which 
are or will be exacerbated by climate change) contribute to the onset of violent conflict25 
while other studies challenge this claim.26 
Evidence from statistical investigations on the link between adverse environmental changes 
and violent conflict are similarly inconclusive. This is shown by Table 1, which summarizes 
the large-N studies concerned with a possible climate-conflict link, which cover more than 
one country and have appeared in the peer review literature. Such studies use countries or 
more recently grid cells of 0.5 or 1.0° edge length as their spatial unit of analysis. They 
investigate whether a significant correlation exists between climate-related environmental 
changes in a given year and the onset or incidence of a violent conflict in the same or the 
following year. As can be seen from Table 1, only the conflictivity of land degradation seems 
to be nearly consensual, with five out of seven studies agreeing on that point. But this finding 
should be approached with caution, given that Fearon as well as Urdal find no correlation 
between cropland scarcity per capita and violent conflict.27 There are no quantitative studies 
about the climate-migration-conflict-nexus, presumably because of inadequate or incomplete 
migration data.28 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
 
24 Jon Barnett, 'Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis', Review of International Studies 26, no. 2 (2000): 
271-88. 
25 Carol C. Ember et al., 'Livestock Raiding and Rainfall Variability in Northern Kenya', Civil Wars 14, no. 2 
(2012): 159-81; Kahl, States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World; Anthony Nyong, Charles Fiki, 
and Robert McLeman, 'Drought-Related Conflicts, Management and Resolution in the West African Sahel: 
Considerations for Climate Change Research', Die Erde 137, no. 3 (2006): 223-48. 
26 Wario Adano et al., 'Climate Change, Violent Conflict and Local Institutions in Kenya’s Dryland', Journal of 
Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 65-80; Tor A. Benjaminsen, 'Does Supply-Induced Scarcity Drive Violent 
Conflicts in the African Sahel? The Case of the Tuareg Rebellion in Northern Mali', Journal of Peace Research 
45, no. 6 (2008): 819-36; Harry Verhoeven, 'Climate Change, Conflict and Development in Sudan: Global Neo-
Malthusian Narratives and Local Power Struggles', Development and Change 42, no. 3 (2011): 679-707. 
27 James D. Fearon, Governance and Civil War Onset, WDR 2011 Background Paper (Washington DC: World 
Bank, 2010); Henrik Urdal, 'People Vs. Malthus: Population Pressure, Environmental Degradation, and Armed 
Conflict Revisited', Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 4 (2005): 417-34. 
28 Reuveny, 'Ecomigration and Violent Conflict'. 
 5 
Thus, the next logical step would be to identify why the findings of the different studies are so 
disparate, address the reasons for this inconclusiveness and then conduct the next wave of 
research which hopefully produces more consensual results. But in practice, there is no 
agreement (and, we suggest, not enough discussion) about the reasons for the 
inconclusiveness of previous research. Possible explanations include a lack of adequate 
theoretical arguments or comprehensive analytical frameworks,29 missing interactions 
between quantitative and qualitative scholars,30 choosing large-scale instead of minor violent 
conflicts as the dependent variable,31 the focus on a too high level of analysis (e.g. whole 
states instead of singular regions or even households)32 or the absence of high quality, high 
resolution data.33 One might add the highly interdisciplinary nature of the subject matter, 
which is discussed by geographers, political scientists, environmental sociologists, political 
ecologists and anthropologists, and receives major inputs from natural scientists (e.g. 
physicists, soil scientists). 
This article presents a different (but complementary) answer to the question of why there is 
still so much disagreement in research on climate change and violent intra-state conflict. In 
order to do so, it adopts a conceptual focus inspired by Dina Zinnes’ classical essay on the 
problem of cumulation.34 Zinnes distinguishes between two forms or levels of scientific 
cumulation:  
‘By additive cumulation I mean that one study adds some information to the existing 
literature on the subject […] Integrative cumulation means that a study ties together and 
explains a set of research findings.’35 
While additive cumulation is a precondition for integrative cumulation, the latter one should 
be seen as the ultimate goal of scientific research. Additive cumulation means that a study 
adds a new hypothesis, variable, correlation or finding to an existing body of knowledge. But 
Zinnes is convinced that ‘most of us want to see a total picture.’36 In other words: Most 
scholars will prefer an approach that is able to combine elements of previous works, to 
 
29 Meierding, 'Climate Change and Conflict' ; Jürgen Scheffran et al., 'Disentangling the Climate-Conflict-Nexus: 
Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Vulnerabilities and Pathways', Review of European Studies 4, no. 5 
(2012): 1-15. 
30 Andrew R. Solow, 'A Call for Peace on Climate and Conflict', Nature 497, no. 7448 (2013): 179-80. 
31 Cullen S. Hendrix and Idean Salehyan, 'Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa', Journal of 
Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 35-50. 
32 John O´Loughlin, Andrew M. Linke, and Frank D. W. Witmer, 'Modeling and Data Choices Sway 
Conclusions About Climate-Conflict Links', PNAS 111, no. 6 (2014): 2054-55. 
33 Thomas Bernauer, Tobias Böhmelt, and Vally Koubi, 'Environmental Changes and Violent Conflict', 
Environmental Research Letters 7, no. 1 (2012): 1-8. 
34 Dina Zinnes, 'The Problem of Cumulation', in In Search of Global Patterns, ed. James N. Rosenau (New 




explain their results and eventually to make some meaningful statements about the subject 
under research as a whole (and not just single aspects of it). According to Zinnes, the key 
obstacle to an integrative cumulation of knowledge is the dominance of an ‘additive 
mentality’37 in a research field, that is, the assumption that producing more and more 
information on a topic is sufficient because the integration of this information into a wider and 
more complete picture would occur automatically. 
Research on climate change and violent conflict has become much more integrative in recent 
years despite the heterogeneity of disciplines dealing with possible climate-conflict links.38 
However, we suggest that there are still many factors which promote an additive rather than 
integrative cumulation of knowledge in the research field, or in other words, that complicate 
the use, assessment and improvement of existing knowledge on the issue by future studies. In 
the following sections, we identify three relevant, but so far widely unacknowledged obstacles 
to the integrative cumulation of knowledge in the research on climate change and violent 
conflict, illustrate them with examples, and make suggestions as to how to overcome them. 
The problems discussed include inadequate labels, insufficient reflection on the limits of 
large-N investigations in the research field and the lack of attention paid to the environmental 
peace perspective. In order to address this last issue, we suggest an integrative theoretical 
framework for the environmental peace perspective which should make it easier for climate 
conflict scholars to integrate findings from this field of investigation. 
 
2 Inadequate labels and terms 
Several terms exist in the debate on climate change and violent conflict which are not 
sufficiently precise and/or are used in a confusing way. This is an important problem, 
especially bearing in mind that labels can have a large influence on how people judge a 
certain position. In International Relations, for instance, the Realist school coined the term 
‘Idealism’ in order to describe and simultaneously discredit the theories of their counterparts – 
a move that was largely successful despite the fact that the approaches covered by this label 
are often not rooted in idealistic perspectives.39 Thus, misleading terms tend to aggravate the 
cumulation of scientific knowledge. 
 
37 Ibid. 
38 Solomon Hsiang, Marshall Burke, and Edward Miguel, 'Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human 
Conflict', Science 341, no. 6151 (2013): 1-14; Janpeter Schilling, Akuno Moses, and Jürgen Scheffran, On Arms 
and Adaptation: Climate Change and Pastoral Conflict in Northern Kenya (Hamburg: CLISEC, 2011). 
39 Andreas Osiander, 'Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited ', International Studies 
Quarterly 42, no. 3 (1998): 409-32. 
 7 
A widespread label for the environmental or climate conflict perspective outlined above is 
Malthusianism or neo-Malthusianism, while proponents of the social conflict perspective are 
frequently termed cornucopians.40 By using these terms, it is implied that the logic behind the 
climate conflict hypotheses can be traced back to Thomas Malthus’ 1798 ‘Essay on the 
Principle of Population’.41 Malthus took a deterministic position by describing the 
discrepancy between the linear growth of agricultural output and the exponential growth of 
human populations as an inevitable cause for human misery and conflict. Classical 
cornucopian positions, in contrast, make anti-deterministic claims that societies either will 
not face environmental problems like climate change or natural resource scarcity, or are able 
to conduct adaptation measures to avoid suffering from such problems.42 But there is an 
important difference between the cornucopian and the social conflict position: the latter do 
not deny the existence of environmental problems with severe and adverse consequences on 
human societies, but simply doubt whether they are empirically related to violent conflict 
onset.43  
A key issue with the label (neo-)Malthusianism is that the large majority of studies 
supporting the climate conflict perspective simply do not make use of deterministic 
arguments. This is true for recent studies which discuss a large number of relevant 
background conditions and intervening variables such as the commercialization of 
resources,44 ethno-political exclusion,45 or ‘groupness’.46 But also the writing of early 
environmental conflict scholars, which are most frequently termed Malthusian, rejects 
deterministic connections between renewable resource scarcity and violent conflict. Bächler 
emphasizes that ‘passing the threshold of violence definitely depends on sociopolitical 
factors and not on the degree of environmental degradation as such’47, while Homer-Dixon 
states: 
 
40 Bernauer, Böhmelt, and Koubi, 'Environmental Changes and Violent Conflict'; Nils Petter Gleditsch, 
'Environmental Conflict: Neomalthusians vs. Cornucopians', in Security and Environment in the Mediterranean: 
Conceptualising Security and Environmental Conflicts, eds. Hans Günter Brauch et al. (Berlin/Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2003), 477-85; Henrik Urdal, 'Population, Resources, and Political Violence: A Subnational Study of 
India, 1956-2002', Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 4 (2008): 590-617. 
41 Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, or a View of Its Past and Present Effects on 
Human Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992 [1798]). 
42 Bjørn Lomborg, The Sceptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); Julian Simon, 'Paradoxically, Population Growth May Eventually End 
Wars', Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 1 (1989): 164-80. 
43 Theisen, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 'Is Climate Change a Driver of Armed Conflict?'. 
44 Schilling, Opiyo, and Scheffran, 'Raiding Pastoral Livelihoods'. 
45 Fjelde and von Uexkull, 'Climate Triggers'. 
46 Kahl, States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World. 
47 Bächler, 'Why Environmental Transformations Causes Violence'.  
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 ‘The relationship between environmental scarcity and violence is invariably complex. 
Scarcity interacts with such contextual factors as the character of the economic system, 
levels of education, ethnic cleavages, class divisions, technological and infrastructural 
capacity, and the legitimacy of the political regime.’48 
Since the attractiveness of positions which are considered deterministic is limited in social 
science contexts, researchers might ignore the findings and arguments of these supposedly 
‘Malthusian’ approaches. The efforts of some scholars show that the insights from Bächler 
and Homer-Dixon can fruitfully be refined, extended and applied to new questions in the 
research field.49 But the majority of environmental and climate conflict scholars continue to 
simply term these kind of works Malthusian or deterministic and do not further engage with 
them. The political ecology tradition of environmental conflict research, for instance, 
emphasizes the dominance of economic and political elites vis-à-vis marginalized groups in 
appropriating land, water, and forest resources.50 Homer-Dixon stresses the importance of 
resource capture processes, meaning that the scarcity of important renewable resources 
‘encourage[s] powerful groups within a society to shift resource distribution in their favor.’51 
This point (among others) provides an opportunity for fruitful discussion between Homer-
Dixon’s work and the political ecology tradition. But both approaches have so far largely 
either ignored or just criticized each other,52 amongst other reasons because the work of one 
side is continuously (and often simplistically) labeled Malthusianism. This prevents the 
integrative cumulation of knowledge. 
There are other labels which are used in a confusing or imprecise way in the research field. 
The dependent variable, for instance, is termed ‘armed conflict’53, ‘violent conflict’54 or ‘civil 
war’.55 Many quantitative studies of the issue do not provide any clear definition of their 
dependent variable. The large majority of the large-N studies cited in Table 1 refer to the 
 
48 Homer-Dixon and Blitt, 'Key Findings'. 
49 Deligiannis, 'The Evolution of Environment-Conflict Research'; Kahl, States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the 
Developing World; Simon Mason et al., 'Linkages between Sub-National and International Water Conflicts: The 
Eastern Nile Basin', in Facing Global Environmental Change: Environment, Human, Energy, Food, Health and 
Water Security Concepts, eds. Hans Günter Brauch et al. (Berlin: Springer, 2009), 325-34. 
50 Sarah Jewitt, 'Political Ecology of Jharkhand Conflicts', Asia Pacific Viewpoint 49, no. 1 (2008): 68-82; Nancy 
Lee Peluso and Michael Watts, 'Violent Environments', in Violent Environments, eds. Nancy Lee Peluso and 
Michael Watts (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 3-38. 
51 Homer-Dixon, 'Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict'. 
52 Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts, 'Violent Environments: Responses', Environmental Change and 
Security Project Report 9, no. 1 (2003): 93-96. 
53 Theisen, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 'Is Climate Change a Driver of Armed Conflict?', 613. 
54 Jürgen Scheffran et al., eds., Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal 
Stability (Berlin: Springer, 2012). 
55 Gerdis Wischnath and Halvard Buhaug, 'On Climate Variability and Civil War in Asia', Climatic Change 122, 
forthcoming (2014), 1. 
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UCDP/PRIO definitions (and datasets)56, which understand armed conflict as ‘a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force 
between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least 
one is the government of a state.’57 This definition is at odds with many other studies which 
contend that climate-related violence is likely to (a) be rather small scale (i.e. below the 25 
death threshold), (b) concern the use of natural resources (rather than government or 
territory), and (c) take place between social groups (i.e. without the involvement of 
governments actors).58 The impacts of climate change and the exact causal chains through 
which they manifest themselves are very likely to vary regarding, for example, urban riots, 
pastoralist fights around water points, and full-blown civil wars.59 But at the moment, these 
different (and at times rather imprecise) definitions of the dependent variable are all too often 
mixed together within the same analytical framework. This is aggravated by the fact that some 
studies focus on the onset and others on the incidence of violent conflict. 
Similar theoretical issues exist with regard to inadequate definitions of the independent 
variable. Many theoretical and empirical studies do not yet distinguish strongly enough 
between the condition of natural resource scarcity (e.g. absolute water scarcity60), the long-
term process of natural resource degradation (e.g. steady precipitation decline61), and short-
term processes of rapid environmental deterioration (e.g. droughts and flash floods62). In 
addition, the labelling of the independent variable as climate change is problematic in many of 
the quantitative studies cited in Table 1, since they focus on temperature and precipitation 
changes within short time periods (usually a year), while climate is usually defined as the 
average of meteorological conditions over time period of at least thirty years.63 A broader and 
more systematic consideration of these issues has so far not been conducted in the research on 
climate change and conflict. Doing so would facilitate communication within the research 
 
56 Jürgen Scheffran, Tobias Ide, and Janpeter Schilling, 'Violent Climate or Climate of Violence? Concepts and 
Relations with Focus on Kenya and Sudan', International Journal of Human Rights 18, forthcoming (2014). 
57 Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., 'Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset', Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 5 
(2002): 615-37, 618f. 
58 Cullen S. Hendrix and Idean Salehyan, 'Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa', Journal of 
Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 35-50; Anthony Nyong, Charles Fiki, and Robert McLeman, 'Drought-Related 
Conflicts, Management and Resolution in the West African Sahel: Considerations for Climate Change Research', 
Die Erde 137, no. 3 (2006): 223-48; Clionadh Raleigh and Dominic Kniveton, 'Come Rain or Shine: An 
Analysis of Conflict and Climate Variability in East Africa', Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 51-64. 
59 Ian A. Brown, 'Assessing Eco-Scarcity as a Cause of the Outbreak of Conflict in Darfur: A Remote Sensing 
Approach', International Journal of Remote Sensing 31, no. 10 (2010): 2513-20; Ember et al., 'Livestock Raiding 
and Rainfall Variability in Northern Kenya'; Sarah Johnstone and Jeffrey Mazo, 'Global Warming and the Arab 
Spring', Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 53, no. 2 (2011): 11-17. 
60 Homer-Dixon, 'Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict'. 
61 Hendrix and Salehyan, 'Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa'. 
62 Rafael Reuveny, 'Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict', Political Geography 26, no. 6 
(2007): 656-73. 
63 Gleditsch, 'Whither the Weather?'.  
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field, stimulate more extensive exchange with related disciplines such as conflict research or 
meteorology, and thus facilitate integrative cumulation of knowledge. 
 
3 The limits of large-N studies 
Methodologically, this research field has been dominated by statistical large-N analyses. For 
instance, four out of the six most recent literature reviews that appeared in leading journals 
draw overwhelmingly or exclusively on large-N studies in order to evaluate the state of the 
art.64 Deligiannis and Meierding are the notable exceptions,65 although the later focuses in 
large parts on strategies for improving large-N studies. A similar example is provided by two 
widely cited special issues on climate change and conflict.66 Twelve of the 20 articles (=60%) 
published in both issues conduct large-N statistical analysis, while only two studies draw 
primarily on case study evidence (10%). 
Large-N studies supply important insights about the generalizability of theories and case 
study findings. However, by producing a growing number of correlations for more regions 
and longer time-periods, a largely additive cumulation of knowledge is promoted. Especially 
in research on the climate-conflict nexus, there have been serious problems with integrating 
the findings of previous studies. There are two reasons for this, neither of which have been 
considered at length thus far: 
Firstly, statistical analyses of a large number of cases are inherently unsuitable for integrating 
factors which are hard to quantify, but are nonetheless crucial for the dynamics of (climate-
related) violent conflicts, such as identities, narratives or threat perceptions.67 Other relevant 
factors, for example the existence of migrant networks68 or traditional, micro-level resource-
sharing agreements69, may be quantifiable, but collecting data on them for a large number of 
cases would be very labor- and cost-intensive. Thus, the concepts and findings of 
environmental sociology, anthropology, political ecology, spatial theory and constructivist 
 
64 Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel, 'Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict'; Vally Koubi et al., 'Do 
Natural Resources Matter for Interstate or Intrastate Armed Conflict?', Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 
(2014): 227-43; Scheffran et al., 'Climate Change and Violent Conflict'; Theisen, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 'Is 
Climate Change a Driver of Armed Conflict?'.  
65 Deligiannis, 'The Evolution of Environment-Conflict Research'; Meierding, 'Climate Change and Conflict'. 
66 Gleditsch, 'Whither the Weather?'; Ragnhild Nordås and Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Climate Change and Conflict', 
Political Geography 26, no. 6 (2007): 627-38. 
67 Christiane Fröhlich, 'Security and Discourse: The Israeli-Palestinian Water Conflict', Conflict, Security & 
Development 12, no. 2 (2012): 123-48; Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War 
(Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
68 Giovanna Gioli, Taliman Khan, and Jürgen Scheffran, 'Remittances and Community Resilience to Conflict and 
Environmental Hazards in Northwestern Pakistan', in Remittance Flows to Post-Conflict States: Perspectives on 
Human Security and Development, ed. Daivi Rodima-Taylor (Boston: Pardee House, 2013), 117-26. 
69 Ayalneh Bogale and Benedikt Korf, 'To Share or Not to Share? (Non-)Violence, Scarcity and Resource Access 
in Somali Region, Ethiopia', Journal of Development Studies 43, no. 4 (2007): 743-65. 
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conflict research are hardly ever taken into account when scholars are assessing a possible 
climate-conflict-link.70  
In addition, there might be some indicators on which data could be collected more or less 
easily, but simply no one has done this yet, so no large-N study can incorporate these 
concepts. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the generalizability of excellent hypotheses is 
not tested since no adequate large-scale datasets for doing so are available. Raleigh and Urdal, 
for instance, quite explicitly state that their variable selection is strongly driven by data 
availability issues: ‘Despite its theoretical importance, we do not attempt to empirically 
capture resource distribution, as such data are currently not available on the local level.’71 
Secondly, the weaknesses of the datasets which are currently available and widely used are 
hardly ever reflected in the research on climate change and violent conflict, while doing so is 
a precondition for the integrative cumulation of knowledge. Rainfall or temperature data are 
often based on satellite measurements, but it is well known that there can be huge differences 
between the perceptions of local inhabitants and of scientific experts or orbit satellites about 
the speed, degree and causes of environmental changes.72 The GLASOD data on land 
degradation used by most studies cited in Table 1 have been criticized for relying on the 
assessments of few experts using inconsistent definitions.73 Similarly, datasets which collect 
and geo-code occurrences of low-level violence (the most likely forms climate-related 
conflicts are going to take) are increasingly used by quantitative studies (see Table 1), but are 
unable to adequately capture episodes of violence in remote areas. 
In order to illustrate this last point, we isolated data on pastoral violence in East Africa, 
probably the most discussed form of violent conflict in the research field, from ACLED and 
SCAD, which are the most elaborated and most often used geo-referenced datasets on low-
level violence.74 We compared these data with the conflict records of CEWARN, which 
 
70 Sven Chojnacki and Bettina Engels, Material Determinism and Beyond: Spatial Categories in the Study of 
Violent Conflict. SFB Working Paper 55 (Berlin: SFB, 2013); Adrian Martin, 'Environmental Conflict between 
Refugee and Host Communities', Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 3 (2005): 329-46; Christopher Timura, 
'“Environmental Conflict” and the Social Life of Environmental Security Discourse', Anthropological Quarterly 
74, no. 3 (2001): 104-13. 
71 Clionadh Raleigh and Henrik Urdal, 'Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Armed Conflict', 
Political Geography 26, no. 6 (2007): 674-94. This example is also highlighted by Chojnacki and Engels, 
Material Determinism and Beyond. 
72 Felipe Murtinho et al., 'Water Scarcity in the Andes: A Comparison of Local Perceptions and Observed 
Climate, Land Use and Socioeconomic Changes', Human Ecology 41, no. 5 (2013): 667-81; Chusak Wittayapak, 
'History and Geography of Identifications Related to Resource Conflicts and Ethnic Violence in Northern 
Thailand', Asian Pacific Viewpoint 49, no. 1 (2008): 111-27. 
73 Benjaminsen, 'Does Supply-Induced Scarcity Drive Violent Conflicts in the African Sahel?'. 
74 Hendrix and Salehyan, 'Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa'; Raleigh and Kniveton, 'Come 
Rain or Shine'. 
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collects information on pastoral violence through field research.75 Since information on these 
periods and regions is available in all three databases, our comparison focused on the years 
2006-2009 and on the Ethiopian and Kenyan side of the Somali cluster as well as on the 
Kenyan and Ugandan side of the Karamoja cluster. 
As can be seen from Figures 1 and 2, CEWARN collected 1.547 incidents of pastoral violence 
with 3,000 deaths between 2006 and 2009, while ACLED registered only 258 incidents 
(16.7% of the amount of incidents collected by CEWARN) with 1,025 deaths (34.2%). Using 
SCAD, we could only detect 17 incidents (1.1%) responsible for 412 deaths (13.73%) for the 
same period. These results indicate that – with the partial exception of ACLED’s performance 
for the Kenyan side of the Somali cluster – even these quite elaborated datasets miss a large 
percentage of the violent conflicts occurring on the ground. These findings are supported by 
Ravnborg et al. who also conclude that the large majority of water-related conflict (and 
cooperation) events in the global South are not recognized by NGO publications and media 
reports (which are the main sources for ACLED and SCAD).76 If the sample of conflict 
events recorded by ACLED or SCAD is not representative (which is likely given factors such 
as urban or media biases in the reporting of such events77), the validity of the large-N studies 
correlating these data with environmental or climatic changes is questionable. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AND 2 HERE 
 
As mentioned above, large-N studies have made several valuable contributions to the 
literature in terms of testing the generalizability of hypotheses and identifying theoretical 
deficits and data needs. The collection of local-level data through field research, as has 
already been done by some studies,78 can further increase the validity of statistical analyses. 
But given their constraints, they should increasingly be complement by qualitative research 
strategies. This goes well beyond calls to use in-depth case studies in order to assess which 
causalities are driving the correlations found by large-N studies or to generate hypotheses 
which have to be tested by quantitative analyses. Although these are important challenges, 
qualitative research can contribute more to our knowledge on climate change and violent 
 
75 CEWARN, 'CEWARN Country Updates', www.cewarn.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view 
&gid=112&Itemid=98 (16/11/2013). 
76 Helle Munk Ravnborg et al., 'Challenges of Local Water Governance: The Extent, Nature and Intensity of 
Local Water-Related Conflict and Cooperation', Water Policy 14, no. 2 (2012): 336-57. 
77 Claudia Simons and Franzisca Zanker, Finding Cases That Fit: Methodological Challenges in Peace 
Research, GIGA Working Paper 189 (Hamburg: GIGA, 2012). 
78 Ember et al., 'Livestock Raiding and Rainfall Variability in Northern Kenya': 159-81; Karen M. Witsenburg 
and Wario R. Adano, 'Of Rain and Raids: Violent Livestock Raiding in Northern Kenya', Civil Wars 11, no. 4 
(2009): 514-38. 
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conflict. If appropriately designed, case studies cannot only generate, but also test hypotheses, 
for instance when extreme or critical cases are investigated or by using most similar or most 
diverse cases techniques.79 The intensive comparison of a medium number of cases has 
greatly elaborated our knowledge of the links between natural resource abundance and violent 
conflict.80 This has been the case because such research designs combine a high 
generalizability of their results with an incorporation of factors that are hard to collect for a 
large number of cases or to quantify at all (e.g. identities or micro-level institutions). 
 
4 Taking the environmental peace perspective into account 
So far the discussions in the research field have overwhelmingly focused on whether or not 
climate change does increase the number of violent conflict occurrences. Little attention has 
been paid to a possible link between climate change and peace, defined here in a narrow sense 
as the absence of violent conflict. While a number of large-N studies find a significant 
correlation between violent conflict and climate change or variability (see Table 1), several 
studies indicate a relationship between a reduced risk for violent conflict onset and freshwater 
scarcity,81 reduced precipitation,82 natural disasters,83 or the scarcity of arable land.84 Some 
case studies conducted in East Africa’s pastoral areas found that violent cattle raids are less 
frequent during times of drought, either because opportunities for raids are unfavorable or 
because culture-specific rules and norms command cooperation during harsh times.85 A whole 
body of literature on environmental peacebuilding deals with the question whether and under 
which circumstances the shared handling of environmental problems affecting two or more 
social groups can contribute to the improvement of relations between those groups.86 
 
79 Bent Flyvbjerg, 'Five Misunderstanding about Case-Study Research', Qualitative Inquiry 12, no. 2 (2006): 
219-45; John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
80 Philippe Le Billon, 'The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts', Political 
Geography 20, no. 5 (2001): 561-84; Michael Ross, 'Does Natural Resource Wealth Influence Civil War? 
Evidence from 13 Cases', International Organization 58, no. 1 (2004): 35-67. 
81 Cullen S. Hendrix and Sarah M. Glaser, 'Trends and Triggers: Climate, Climate Change and Civil Conflict in 
Sub-Saharan Africa', Political Geography 26, no. 6 (2007): 695-715. 
82 Buhaug, 'Climate Not to Blame for African Civil Wars'; Ole Magnus Theisen, 'Climate Clashes? Weather 
Variability, Land Pressure, and Organized Violence in Kenya, 1989-2004', Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 
(2012): 81-96; Witsenburg and Adano, 'Of Rain and Raids'. 
83 Rune T. Slettebak, 'Don't Blame the Weather! Climate-Related Natural Disasters and Civil Conflict', Journal 
of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 163-76. 
84 Pedram Rowhani et al., 'Malnutrition and Conflict in East Africa: The Impacts of Resource Variability on 
Human Security', Climatic Change 105, no. 1 (2011): 207-22; Theisen, 'Climate Clashes?'; Urdal, 'People Vs. 
Malthus'. 
85 Adano et al., 'Climate Change, Violent Conflict and Local Institutions in Kenya’s Dryland'; Bogale and Korf, 
'To Share or Not to Share?'. 
86 Alexander Carius, Environmental Peacemaking - Environmental Cooperation as an Instrument of Crisis 
Prevention and Peacebuilding: Condition for Success and Constraints (Berlin: Adelphi, 2006); Ken Conca and 
Geoffrey Dabelko, 'The Problems and Possibilities of Environmental Peacemaking', in Environmental 
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Similarly, disaster diplomacy studies focus on the possibility of cooperation between hostile 
groups, induced by natural disasters.87 In the following, we term this body of literature the 
environmental peace perspective. 
So far, there is little exchange between researchers working on environmental peace and those 
dealing with possible links between environmental/climate change and violent conflict. This 
is unfortunate because the insights gained by the literature on environmental peace could help 
climate conflict scholars to understand (a) which factors make societies resilient to 
environmental stress and violent conflict, (b) the influence of environmental stress on 
changing intergroup relations (from cooperation to conflict to violence and vice versa) and (c) 
the conditions under which cooperation around environmental problems fails and 
environmental conflicts therefore become more likely. 
Thus, drawing more strongly on approaches developed and insights gained by environmental 
peace scholars would benefit the debate about the climate-violence nexus and enhance 
integrative cumulation of knowledge in the wider research on the role of environmental 
factors in facilitating peace and conflict. However, one problem in this regard is that there is 
little interaction between the various research traditions of the environmental peace 
perspective. Therefore, we use the remainder of this section to suggest an integrative 
theoretical framework for the environmental peace perspective88 in the hope that this will 
facilitate exchange between research on environmental peacebuilding, disaster diplomacy and 
environmental/climate conflict. 
When defining peace as the absence of inter-group violent conflict, one can distinguish three 
phases of the process through which shared environmental problems stimulate peace. These 
phases can be examined from two different theoretical approaches (Figure 2).  
We call the first approach sociological since it draws on insights from early disaster 
sociology.89 As noted by Charles E. Fritz, disasters usually produce a ‘community of 
sufferers’ which is ‘characterized by a strong feeling of mutual suffering and in-group 
solidarity’ and ‘develops an interactional system uniquely its own’90, meaning that pre-
 
Peacemaking, eds. Ken Conca and Geoffrey Dabelko (Baltimoore: John Hopkins University Press, 2002), 220-
33. 
87 Ilan Kelman, Disaster Diplomacy: How Disasters Affect Peace and Conflict (London: Routledge, 2012); 
Philip A. Streich and David Bell Mislan, 'What Follows the Storm? Research on the Effect of Disasters on 
Conflict and Cooperation', Global Change, Peace & Security 26, no. 1 (2014): 55-70. See 
www.disasterdiplomacy.org for recent developments in the field. 
88 For a critique of the environmental peace perspective see for instance Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel, 'Quantifying 
the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict'; or Travis Nelson, 'When Disaster Strikes: On the Relationship 
between Natural Disaster and Interstate Conflict', Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 2 (2010): 155-74. 
89 Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1979). 
90 Charles E. Fritz, Disasters and Mental Health: Therapeutic Principles Drawn from Disaster Studies (Newark: 
Disaster Research Center, 1996). 
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disaster social, ethnic or political cleavages lose their salience. In a similar way, post-disaster 
suffering can create empathy between/with the parties affected.91 This reduces the likelihood 
of violent conflict onset and might even stimulate cooperation between the affected groups.92 
This claim should hold true for slow-onset disasters (e.g. droughts) and even more so for 
rapid-onset disasters (e.g. a cyclones). In a second step, the regular interaction of people from 
different social groups in order to manage common environmental (or disaster-related) 
challenges can create mutual trust and understanding, thereby laying the foundations for 
further cooperation.93 In the final (and more ideal-typical) phase, the perceptions of the 
involved parties are transformed due to constant interaction and a common identity is 
(partially) developed.94 
The second approach has its intellectual roots in functionalist and neo-functionalist theory.95 
It argues that environmental problems tend to cross the borders between various social groups 
(environmental interdependence), thus providing material incentives for all affected parties to 
work together along functionalist rather than territorial or ethnical divides.96 Such cooperation 
can be initiated by political or economic elites (top down) as well as by civil society (bottom 
up) – a claim that is shared by the functionalist and the sociological approaches.97 After 
cooperation is initiated during the first stage, the occurrence of spill-over effects represents 
the second stage of environmental peace realization as outlined by the functionalist 
approach.98 Spill-over in this context means that bi- or multilateral environmental cooperation 
‘will set in motion economic, social and political progresses which generate pressures towards 
further integration.’99 Finally, there is no genuine third phase within the functionalist 
approach. All authors agree that ‘the creation of a common regional identity [… and] 
 
91 James Ker-Lindsay, 'Greek-Turkish Reapproachement: The Impact Of "Disaster Diplomacy"', Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 14, no. 1 (2000): 215-32. 
92 Jean-Christophe Gaillard, Elsa Clavé, and Ilan Kelman, 'Wave of Peace? Tsunami Disaster Policy in Aceh, 
Indonesia', Geoforum 39, no. 1 (2008): 511-26; Slettebak, 'Don't Blame the Weather!'. 
93 Raul Lejano, 'Theorizing Peace Parks: Two Models of Collective Action', Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 5 
(2006): 563-81. 
94 Ken Conca, 'The Case for Environmental Peacemaking', in Environmental Peacemaking, eds. Ken Conca and 
Geoffrey Dabelko (Baltimoore: John Hopkins University Press, 2002), 1-22. 
95 Ernst B. Haas, 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing', 
International Organization 24, no. 4 (1970): 607-46. 
96 Saleem Ali, 'A Natural Connection between Ecology and Peace?', in Peace Parks: Conservation and Conflict 
Resolution, ed. Saleem Ali (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1-18; Nicole Harari and Jesse 
Roseman, Environmental Peacebuilding, Theory and Practice: A Case Study of the Good Water Neighbours 
Project and in Depth Analysis of the Wadi Fukin/Tzur Hadassah Communities (Amman/Bethlehem/Tel Aviv: 
FoEME, 2008). 
97 Conca and Dabelko, 'The Problems and Possibilities of Environmental Peacemaking'. 
98 Seden Akcinaroglu, Jon DiCicco, and Elizabeth Radziszewski, 'Avalanches and Olive Branches: A 
Multimethod Analysis of Disasters and Peacemaking in Interstate Rivalries', Political Research Quarterly 64, 
no. 2 (2011): 260-75. 
99 Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 'Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the 
New Dynamism of the EC', Millenium 20, no. 1 (1991): 1-22. 
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mutually recognized rights and expectations’100 rather than the rational engagement in more 
and more cooperation due to functional needs represents the final stage of environmental-
induced peace development. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
Based on existing empirical research, one can further specify the framework presented above. 
Firstly, both the sociological and the functionalist approaches agree that the three phases 
develop consecutively over time, while it can be assumed that during all phases the risk of 
violent conflict onset is reduced. But the process of creating peace through being affected by 
or cooperating over shared environmental problems can fail at the initial phase or before 
entering the second and third phases respectively, with the potential to frustrate and alienate 
hostile groups even further.101 According to Kelman, this is empirically even the most likely 
outcome.102 The symbolic embedment of natural resources in contradictive narratives and 
identities, the ignorance of the needs of local inhabitants, as well as trade-offs between 
ecological conservation and economic utilization are, among other factors, critical obstacles to 
a peace-inducing effect of environmental problems.103  
Secondly, there are several conditions which are likely to facilitate the development of 
environmental peace, such as the absence of recent occurrences of violence, the active 
involvement of civil society organizations and scientific networks or the existence of mutual 
trust and elite support.104 Thirdly, as already implied by the last two statements, political and 
socio-economic factors are more important for the existence of peace than shared 
environmental problems or environmental cooperation, especially in the long run.105 And 
fourthly, although they can clearly be distinguished on a theoretical basis, elements of the 
 
100 Carius, Environmental Peacemaking - Environmental Cooperation as an Instrument of Crisis Prevention and 
Peacebuilding. 
101 Ken Conca, Alexander Carius, and Geoffrey Dabelko, 'Building Peace through Environmental Cooperation', 
in State of the World 2005: Redefining Global Security, ed. Worldwatch Institute (Washington DC: Worldwatch, 
2005), 144-57. 
102 Kelman, Disaster Diplomacy. 
103 Ken Conca and Jennifer Wallance, 'Environment and Peacebuilding in War-Torn Societies: Lessons Form the 
UN Environment Programme's Experience with Post-Conflict Assessment', in Assessing and Restoring Natural 
Resources in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, eds. David Jensen and Steve Lonergan (London: Earthscan, 2012), 
63-84; Arthur Green, 'Social Identity, Natural Resources, and Peacebuilding' (paper presented at the CAPRi 
Workshop on Collective Action, Property Rights, and Conflict in Natural Resources Management, Siem Reap, 
28/06-01/07/2010). 
104 Carius, Environmental Peacemaking - Environmental Cooperation as an Instrument of Crisis Prevention and 
Peacebuilding; Moira Feil, Diana Klein, and Meike Westerkamp, Regional Cooperation on Environment, 
Economy and Natural Resource Management: How Can It Contribute to Peacebuilding? (Brussels: Initiative for 
Peacebuilding, 2009); Ilan Kelman, 'Acting on Disaster Diplomacy', Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 2 
(2006): 215-40. 
105 Kelman, 'Acting on Disaster Diplomacy'. 
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sociological and functionalistic approach are usually intertwined in the frameworks of most 
empirical studies and even more so in the real situations on the ground. 
The environmental peace perspective described here has not received sufficient scholarly 
attention until now, and consequentially, many tasks for future research remain.106 There are 
only few comprehensive case studies on the link between (climate change-induced) 
environmental stress and the absence of violence, especially on the intra-state level. While 
many large-N studies on environmental or climate change and violent conflict exist, there is 
no statistical analysis explicitly concerned with environmental peace. Such studies could ask, 
for instance, whether all environmental problems have similar impacts or whether there are 
differences between, for example, soil degradation, tropical storms and droughts. It is also 
worth knowing whether environmental problems stimulate just the absence of violence, or 
even the occurrence of cooperation, or both, or none of these outcomes. Since, to our 
knowledge, no subnational, geo-referenced dataset on cooperative behavior exists, we suggest 
either to operationalize the Global Data on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) dataset 
which covers all kinds of (not just conflict or violent) events107 or to collect local level data 
through field research.108 The last option would also help to overcome some of the problems 
with large-N studies described in the previous section. Case and statistical studies should also 
take seriously the three-staged model derived from the literature above and investigate 
whether the occurrence of environmental problems lead to the absence of violence/onset of 
cooperation in the short-, medium- or/and long-term.  
 
5 Conclusion 
This article started with a review of the existing literature on climate change and violent 
conflict, which has its roots in the research on environmental conflicts. While climate change 
is unlikely to be associated with inter-state wars, there is no consensus regarding a possible 
link between climate change and intra-state violent conflicts. We claimed that one reason for 
this disagreement between climate conflict scholars is the lack of integrative cumulation of 
knowledge (as defined by Zinnes) in this highly interdisciplinary research field.  
Based on this assumption, three suggestions for facilitating integrative cumulation of 
knowledge in the research on climate change and violent conflict have been formulated. 
Firstly, authors should avoid confusing terminology. The labels cornucopian and Malthusian 
 
106 Streich and Mislan, 'What Follows the Storm?'. 
107 Kalev Leetaru and Philip A. Schrodt, 'GDELT: Global Data on Events, Location and Tone, 1979-2012' (paper 
presented at the 54th ISA Annual Convention, San Francisco, 03/04/-06/04/2013). 
108 Ravnborg et al., 'Challenges of Local Water Governance'. 
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as well as the operationalization of key variables were discussed in greater detail. Secondly, 
the limits of large-N studies in the research field should be reflected more carefully in order to 
assess the explanatory power of these studies, improve their design and complement them 
with good qualitative research. These limits are the availability of data – especially on 
concepts such as identities or micro-level institutions – and the reliability of existing datasets. 
Possible solutions for this include the collection of local-level data through field research or to 
rely stronger on systematically designed case studies. Thirdly, climate conflict researchers 
would benefit from insights in and approaches of the environmental peace literature in order 
to gain a more complete understanding about the importance of environmental factors in 
inducing cooperation, conflict and violence. Such a perspective could also draw our attention 
to possible opportunities for improving inter-group relations which are opened up by climate 
change. In order to facilitate exchange between both areas of study, we suggested an 
integrative framework for the environmental peace perspective 
There are certainly other problems regarding the integrative cumulation of knowledge in the 
research on climate change and violent conflict. These are either examined by other recent 
reviews of the literature or remain to be discussed in future works. To name just three 
examples: There are other communication problems besides confusing labels which aggravate 
the integrative cumulation of knowledge, such as the lack of exchange with scholars from the 
global South with a high expertise on the regions under discussion. Similarly, the 
environmental peace perspective is not the only insightful approach that is hardly ever 
considered by research on climate change and violent conflict. As discussed above, exchange 
with political ecologists could be especially productive since both approaches focus on a 
similar subject matter.109 Finally, Nordås and Gleditsch encouraged scholars several years ago 
to ‘balance the positive and negative effects of climate change’, for instance by taking into 
account longer growing seasons in higher latitudes or increasing precipitation levels in some 
regions.110 But this call has widely gone unheard, with the partial exception of some studies 
highlighting the positive impacts of migration.111 
Based on our experience of conducting research on climate change and violent conflict, we 
discussed three obstacles to the integrative cumulation of knowledge that we believed to be 
among the most relevant and most unnoticed to date. We hope that the suggestions developed 
 
109 Kristina Dietz and Bettina Engels, 'Immer (mehr) Ärger wegen der Natur? - Für eine gesellschafts- und 
konflikttheoretische Analyse von Konflikten um Natur', Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 43, 
forthcoming (2014). 
110 Nordås and Gleditsch, 'Climate Change and Conflict'. 
111 Richard Black et al., 'Migration as Adaptation', Nature 478, no. 7370 (2011): 447-49; Jürgen Scheffran, Elina 
Marmer, and Papa Sow, 'Migration as a Contribution to Resilience and Innovation in Climate Adaptation: Social 
Networks and Co-Development in Northwest Africa', Applied Geography 33, no. 1 (2012): 119-27. 
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above stimulate discussion among researchers and contribute to the answering of the question 
of whether, and if so under which circumstances, climate change stimulates violent conflict – 




Significant relation to violent 
conflict onset112 




Burke et al. 2009a 
Hsiang et al. 2011d 
O’Loughlin et al. 2012c 
Buhaug2010 a 
Koubi et al. 2012  
O’Loughlin et al. 2014 a 
Wischnath & Buhaug 2014 e 
Reduced 
precipitation 
Fjelde & von Uexkull 2012b 
Hendrix & Glaser 2007b 
Hendrix & Salehyan 2012a 
Hsiang et al. 2011d 
Miguel et al. 2004b 
Raleigh & Kniveton 2012c 
Buhaug 2010a 
Buhaug & Theisen 2012a 
Brückner & Ciccone 2010b 
Burke et al. 2009a 
Koubi et al. 2012 
Nel & Righarts 2008 
O´Loughlin et al. 2012c 
O’Loughlin et al. 2014 a 
Theisen et al. 2012a 
Wischnath & Buhaug 2014e 
More rainfall 
extremes 
Hendrix & Salehyan 2012a 
Raleigh & Kniveton 2012c 
Koubi et al. 2012 
Wischnath & Buhaug 2014e 
Lower availability 
of freshwater 
Gizelis & Wooden 2010 
Hauge & Ellingsen 1998 
Raleigh & Urdal 2007 
Hendrix & Glaser 2007b 
Theisen 2008 
Land degradation Biermann et al. 1998 
Esty et al. 1999 
Hauge & Ellingsen 1998 
Raleigh & Urdal 2007 
Theisen 2008 
Hendrix & Glaser 2007b 
Rowhani et al. 2011 c 
Climate-related 
natural disasters 
Besley & Persson 2011 
Drury & Olson 1998 
Hsiang et al. 2011d 
Nel & Righarts 2008 
Bergholt & Lujala 2012 
Omelicheva 2011 
Slettebak 2012 
See Appendix I for the full references for this table. 
a  Focuses only on Africa. 
b  Focuses only on Sub-Saharan Africa.  
c  Focuses only on parts of East Africa. 
d Focuses only on countries affected by El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO). 
e Focuses only on Asia. 
Table 1: Overview about large-N studies concerning a possible climate-conflict link 
 
112 Even if the relationship is weak, indirect or dependent on scope conditions. 
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